government are challenged daily in Afghanistan by corruption. Relatively large amounts of U.S. and foreign aid intended to help restore stability to Afghanistan may do just the opposite. Malign actors have learned how to access billions of dollars of economic and military aid each year. Ironically, many of these funds end up directly supporting organizations that oppose U.S. and NATO interests. In fact, despite significant efforts to improve security and governance in Afghanistan, perceptions of corruption have grown significantly. Many suggest that current efforts and strategy may be making the issue of corruption worse. After three decades of war, current reports show that Afghanistan is one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world. It is also one of the most corrupt. With spiraling unemployment and more than half the country living below the poverty line, making a difference in a dilemma like corruption will require many difficult decisions. This paper considers the impact of corruption on our overall strategy for Afghanistan and investigates efficient ways to shape our policy for combating corruption.
CORRUPTION IN AFGHANISTAN -SOMEBODY ELSE'S PROBLEM?
Afghan public enthusiasm for the government is waning after years of unmet expectations. The economy, devastated by more than thirty years of war, has not recovered sufficiently to provide for the people, while the government remains largely ineffective and riven by corruption. CJIATF Shafafiyat was organized late last year in response to the problem.
2
Already sensitive to the efficiency of our efforts after nine years in Afghanistan, leaders worked hard to address the problem. Some people warned that corruption is not our problem at all. These people referred to corruption as a -strategic dilemma.‖ The strategic dilemma is this: We acknowledge that corruption has a significant impact on our objectives in Afghanistan; however, we also understand that there is little that we can do to directly impact such a problem for a sovereign nation. Corruption therefore is likely someone else's problem.
There are no -silver bullets‖ that can quickly eradicate the problem and simplify our mission. However, after so much attention, can we accept an indirect approach that avoids solving this seemingly insurmountable problem? This second group also recognizes that Afghanistan cannot likely solve the issue either. Rather, Afghanistan must learn to work with an acceptable level of corruption. They confirm that the strategic dilemma of corruption in Afghanistan cannot be someone else's problem; it has to be Afghanistan's problem. Obama shared his strategy in the region, saying that -Our overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.‖ 5 The president then shared three objectives that would enable U.S. strategy for the region:
1. We must deny al-Qa'ida a safe haven.
2. We must reverse the Taliban's momentum and deny it the ability to overthrow the government.
3. And we must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan's security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan's future. Government. Today, the lack of a well established local government in much of Afghanistan is a significant destabilizing factor. Afghanistan's diverse population naturally favors a strong local government and a decentralized national government.
The local government has the strength of meeting the needs of the locals and the weakness of little oversight over a local leader who may be prone to corruption. If a community has an autocratic leader who is abusing power, it is unlikely that the central government will do much to serve the needs of the local community.
Economics. A history of strife and conflict in an underdeveloped nation has created an economy with a growing dependence on aid organizations. 25 This figure suggests those who need the aid the most are often the ones who benefit the least. There is another competition that is growing in concern:
So-called NGOs --non-governmental organizations that range from charities to "not-for-profit" infrastructure providers --are ballooning in Afghanistan, raising fears that they are consuming far more of aid budgets than they should, while delivering far less than they promise. Afghanistan, like many developing countries with weak institutions, has long had a major problem with corruption. Toss tendencies towards autocratic power and ethnic strife into the mix, and it comes as no surprise that competition for aid dollars has only accelerated and deepened problems with corruption. 28 The lure of the two largest opportunities for income in Afghanistan, foreign aid and the drug trade, create significant competition amongst otherwise limited opportunities to make money. The combination of destitute citizens and these extreme opportunities fuels this competition and often drives otherwise law abiding citizens into corruption.
These key factors in Afghanistan's strategic environment influence many forms of corruption that exist in the country today. There seems no end in innovative ways to abuse entrusted power for private gain. Some of the more prevalent forms of corruption include graft, bribery, trading influence, patronage, nepotism, elections, embezzlement, kickbacks, organized crime, and drug trade. 29 In fact -…for an overwhelming 59% of the population the daily experience of public dishonesty is a bigger concern than insecurity (54%) and unemployment (52%).‖ 30 This trend creates distrust between the people and their government and increases the risk associated with the success of the U.S. and NATO mission in Afghanistan by destabilizing the region.
The Nature of the Issue
Ms. Caron, a technologist experienced in wicked problems, suggests that -we are moving from a world of problems to a world of dilemmas,‖ where situations with unsatisfactory choices prevail. 31 This is certainly true with regard to the nature of corruption. She contends that while problems demand speed, analysis, and elimination of uncertainty to solve, dilemmas demand patience, sense making with engagement of uncertainty to manage. characteristic makes corruption very difficult to address. The uncertain and secretive nature of corruption empowers it to exploit power at every available opportunity. 37 The following examples highlight the ways that uncertainty enables corruption and show the impact that corruption has on reconstruction, poverty, and business opportunities:
 -Economic uncertainty encourages politicians to exploit current opportunities.‖ Given the years of uncertainty and the feast or famine existence which exists with foreign aid, -Very few officials can anticipate lifelong job security or a guaranteed pension. economic professors suggest that although corruption is widely studied, significant -disagreements remain about how to define its causes and consequences.‖ They suggest that this general lack of consensus reflects the complexity of the problem. Police exploited technology -to pay salaries through mobile telephones, rather than in cash‖ using Afghanistan's relatively robust cellular network. 47 In a country of 28 million, there are 12 million cell phones. This network offered the Afghan government a significant opportunity to address corruption:
 It immediately found that at least 10% of its payments had been going to ghost policemen who didn't exist; middlemen in the police hierarchy were pocketing the difference.
 Salaries for Afghan police and soldiers are calculated to be competitive with Taliban salaries, but police and deployed soldiers had been receiving only a fraction of the amount paid by U.S. taxpayers because of corruption in the payment system.
 Most Afghan police assumed that they had been given a significant raise, when, in fact, they simply received their full pay for the first time--over the phone. 48 The Afghan people have embraced the cell phone. The challenge is now how best to integrate technology into other programs and policies that are meaningful to the people.
Technology in the existing network offers powerful options for combating corruption.
Given the intensity of the problem, this paper further defines Ms. Caron's dilemma as a strategic dilemma, one that is not solved but must be managed. The nature of corruption in Afghanistan is a strategic dilemma. Corruption is -unsolvable, complex and often messy, threatening, enigmatic and confusing, and has two or more puzzling choices.‖ 49 Assessments from surveys done by IWA and TI suggest the allencompassing nature of Afghanistan's corruption. The New York Times, highlighted corruption's "overwhelming scale, and the dispiriting challenge it poses to American officials" in a recent study. 50 The article showed that -bribery, extortion and embezzlement are the norm and the honest official is a distinct outlier.‖ 51 These indicators define the nature of corruption as a dilemma requiring long term efforts. Each survey suggests that we have exceeded acceptable costs. Such strong public opinion has historically influenced public leader's decisions.
Work done by
General Petraeus' testimony before the SACS recognized these strong current public sentiments and consequently encouraged senate leaders to stand by our important commitments in Afghanistan. 73 The impact of a prevailing public opinion was evident during General Petraeus' testimony and will likely play increasingly significant roles in our policy in Afghanistan as the U.S. gets closer to the 2012 election.
Given that U.S. forces are at their peak this year and could begin reductions starting this summer, it is evident that success is at a tipping point. By characterizing successes as -fragile‖ and -reversible,‖ General Petraeus acknowledged both the prospects for success and failure. 74 Translating General Petraeus' comments into a quantifiable strategic risk is an important take away from his current testimony. General Petraeus was even handed when considering the current probability of success. His acknowledgement of -fragile‖ and -reversible‖ translates into a medium probability of success. Given President Obama and General Petraeus' continued discussion of vital national interests for this region, the impact of failure on our interests would be critical. 75 Such a significant strategic risk to our national interests demands significant work to mitigate. General
Petraeus certainly acknowledges this. The assessment of -high‖ strategic risk frames the mission in Afghanistan in an important way. If, in fact, vital interests are at stake, the national security of the U.S.
could be in peril. The U.S. therefore cannot afford to be indecisive or inefficient given our current commitment to leave Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
Strategy Recommendations
Thinking in terms of the strategic framework of ends, ways, and means is useful when developing strategic guidance for focusing our plan and resources to support Afghanistan in their anti corruption efforts. 78 Absent such a framework, our work 22 becomes difficult and unity of effort problems develop when large groups of people do not clearly understand the desired outcome, courses of action, or what resources are available to support the plan. 79 The recommendations below should be used as strategic guidance for dealing with corruption. This strategic guidance forms the basis of a strategy that supports Afghanistan's anti corruption efforts.
The CJIATF-Shafafiyat should develop in close coordination with the Afghan government a detailed plan that spells out:
 What specifically is to be done by the CJIATF?
 How is this work to be done?
 What resources are required to do it in this manner? 80 Ideally, to ensure unity of effort, this plan should be approved by appropriate convince President Karzai that we are on his team and need his cooperation. 83 As the GIRoA builds capacity and becomes more independent, more changes are likely required. Use CJIATF to manage the transition effectively.
 Using CJIATF, carefully craft terms of reference to encourage support across the entire CJIATF members while maintaining unity of effort. 84 Recognize that anti corruption efforts are in their infancy and will require time and continued support. The anti corruption efforts of CJIATF must ensure the success of both the U.S.
and Afghanistan in order to achieve President Obama's objectives that enable President
Karzai to satisfy GIRoA's commitments towards combating corruption and promoting transparency and accountability as is indicated in their constitution.
Conclusion
Since corruption competes with large annual commitments that the United States has made to Afghanistan, it is a serious concern for the U.S. Government. Having invested billions of U.S. dollars to meet our objectives, the American public is growing anxious to see returns on the key objectives that President Obama established in Afghanistan.
Soon after assuming office and while reviewing our interests in Afghanistan, President Obama referred to Afghanistan as a -wicked problem,‖ calling Afghanistan a -tough struggle, a Himalayan slog that we must win.‖ 87 The issue of corruption has grown so significantly that leaders in Afghanistan use the same -wicked problem‖ descriptor to characterize corruption. -Solutions to wicked problems are not right or wrong, simply ‗better,' ‗worse,' ‗good enough,' or ‗not good enough.'" 88 Faced with the dilemma of how best to help in this environment, finding areas of common interest and moving forward together seems responsible.
The president aptly recognized that U.S. forces will have to make their way in a very tough environment. In such an environment, a unified effort that serves mutual interests is essential if stakeholders are to work together effectively. There have been many efforts at unifying the international community to support Afghanistan. In fact, the Afghanistan Compact met in London in 2006, to address this issue.
Working closely with the United Nations, the international community and Corruption is such a culturally sensitive and difficult issue, that the solution will likely require political concessions that can only be made by sovereign leaders. Therefore, corruption is not a problem for the U.S. to solve directly. Rather, as GIRoA improves on the efficiency of their governance, rule of law and security, pillars that they agreed to in the Afghanistan Compact, corruption will become less of an issue. As the institutions in Afghanistan mature and develop in effectiveness, Afghanistan can decide on new commitments that take a more direct approach. However, given the nature of corruption and its prevalence in Afghanistan, an indirect approach by the international community would likely be more effective.
